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STRINGS ATTACHED - VIOLIN FRAUD AND 
OTHER DECEPTIONS 
Carla J. Shapreau * 
VIOLIN FRAUD: DECEPTION, FORGERY, THEFT, AND THE LAW. By 
Brian W. Harvey. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. 
viii, 126. $35. 
The lure of the violin has stirred passion in the hearts and minds of 
musicians and collectors of the violin family, 1 many of whom have 
fallen victim to fraud and other misdeeds throughout history. The 
subject of such misdeeds, from a legal standpoint, is the focus of a 
provocative new book, Violin Fraud: Deception, Forgery, Theft, and 
the Law, by Brian W. Harvey.2 Harvey's book examines the micro-
cosm of the violin world and incorporates a general overview of civil 
and criminal English law as applied to, among other things, violin 
theft and the intentional and negligent misattribution and description 
of violins. 
This book review includes three Parts: a general discussion of the 
issues Harvey raises; an examination of the possible legal implications 
of secret commissions paid to violin teachers by violin dealers or mak-
ers, which Harvey touches on briefly; and an analysis of how the dis-
covery of allegedly false "opinions" as to the authenticity or 
description of a violin may affect a consumer's remedies when discov-
ery is not made within the applicable statute of limitations. 
I. THE PLAYERS AND THE PRACTICES 
Harvey sets the backdrop for his analysis by describing the gamut 
of players involved in the violin trade, including the "suppliers" on the 
one hand (violin dealers, violin makers, and auction houses) and those 
creating demand for instruments (musicians, students, and collectors) 
on the other. As Harvey observes, the violin involves both visual and 
musical aesthetics (p. 2), which together make it a unique hybrid of 
the worlds of art and music. 
Woven throughout Violin Fraud are entertaining historical anec-
• Attorney, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Oakland, Cal., specializing in intellectual prop-
erty and commercial law. B.A. 1983, Humboldt State University (magna cum Iaude); J.D. 1988, 
University of California, Hastings. The author is also a professional violin maker and a member 
of the American Federation of Violin and Bow Makers. - Ed. 
1. The term violin as used in this review encompasses all members of the violin family, in-
cluding the violin, viola, cello, and double bass. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Birmingham. 
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dotes. For example, in 1685 in Italy, a man petitioned the Duke of 
Modena for assistance in a matter involving the false labeling of a 
violin: 
Your most Serene Highness, 
Tomasso Antonio Vitali, your most humble petitioner, now at the ser-
vice of Your Most Serene Highness, bought of Francesco Capilupi, 
through the medium of the Rev. Ignazio Paltrinieri, a violin f~r the price 
of twelve pistoles because this violin bore the label of Nicolo Amati, a 
maker of great repute in his profession. Your petitioner has, however, 
discovered that the said violin was falsely labelled, he having found un-
derneath the label one of Francesco Ruggieri, called "II Pero,'' a maker 
of much less repute, whose violins at the utmost do not realize more than 
three pistoles. Your petitioner has consequently been deceived by the 
false label, and he appeals to Your Most Serene Highness for the ap· 
pointment of a legal representative, who, without many formalities and 
judicial proceedings, and after ascertaining the petitioner's proofs of his 
assertions, should quickly provide [relief]. 
That God may long preserve Your Most Serene Highness's precious 
life .... 
(Signed) TOMASSO A. VITALI. [pp. 10-11] 
Harvey also provides a fairly detailed description of violin forgers' 
practices, including artificial distressing of varnish, simulated wear 
patterns, neck grafts for purported proof of conversion from baroque 
to the more modern neck length, creation of strategic "repaired 
cracks" with interior studs, and forged labels (pp. 68-73). 
As with fine art, the value of a violin is greatly enhanced if the 
instrument is attributed to a famous maker from a particular geo-
graphic location and time period. Although musicians and collectors 
have traditionally sought out Italian violins from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, with the inflation of the prices of such violins, 
consumers are now discovering the merits of English, French, and 
German violins from the classic and postclassic periods as well as the 
virtues of modern violins made worldwide. 
Although the practice of deception in the violin trade has contin-
ued unabated for centuries, there is a surprising dearth of reported 
opinions in the United States and England relating to such misdeeds 
(p. 15). With a virtual absence of caselaw involving the violin family 
from which to draw, "art law" provides the most fertile analogy for 
substantive law with respect to claims for misrepresentation, breach of 
contract, breach of warranty, replevin, and conversion, as well as re-
lated claims, because of the near identity of factual and legal issues 
that occur in transactions involving artwork and violins. 
Harvey's book, although based on English law, discusses the same 
basic substantive civil claims that are likely to arise under U.S. law in 
cases of misattribution and misdescription, such as fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of express and im-
plied warranties (pp. 20-39, 46-85). In both England and the Unit~d 
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States, a court will generally not find negligence claims meritorious if 
the seller uses the care, skill, and due diligence ordinarily used by rep-
utable violin makers or dealers practicing in the same or a similar lo-
cality under similar circumstances.3 For breach of contract and 
warranty claims, the seller may successfully assert various defenses, 
including mistake, 4 fraud, failure of consideration, an appropriately 
worded and conspicuous disclaimer,5 a limitation of remedies provi-
sion in a sales agreement involving a certification of authenticity or 
value, and the statute of limitations. 6 
English law diverges from U.S. law with respect to stolen goods 
and acquisition of title. English law employs the rule of "market 
overt" (pp. 95-98), which Harvey describes as a "quaint, awkward, 
and far from creditable part of English law" (p. 99). The doctrine of 
market overt allows a buyer to acquire good title to stolen goods if 
they are purchased in good faith, without notice of any defect or want 
of title on the part of the seller, and sold in a "market" that is "open, 
public, and legally constituted by grant, prescription, or statute" (p. 
96). In contrast, in the United States, a good-faith purchaser c;annot 
generally acquire title to, or right to possession of, stolen property.7 
However, the statute of limitations may bar an owner's right to 
recover a stolen violin. Again, the law in England and the United 
States differs. Harvey states that an owner's right to title in England is 
extinguished and his right to claim damages is barred if discovery of 
the theft and the whereabouts of the violin occurs more than six years 
from the date a good-faith purchaser buys a violin (pp. 98-99). 
In sharp contrast, in the United States two rules have evolved that 
may toll the statute of limitations on an owner's cause of action 
against a good-faith purchaser arising from the theft of artwork. 8 The 
minority rule, known as the "demand rule," tolls the statute of limita-
3. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL [BAJI] 6.37 (7th ed. Supp. 1994) (re-
garding professional negligence). 
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Zimbalist, 38 P.2d 170, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (holding a sale to be 
unenforceable when there was a mutual mistake on the part of plaintiff collector and defendant 
violinist as to the authenticity of purported Stradivarius and Guarnerius violins). 
5. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990). 
6. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1990), which provides a four-year statute oflimitations, likely applies to 
contract or breach of warranty claims involving the sale of a violin. 
7. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (1990) (providing that "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title which 
his transferor had or had power to transfer") Clearly, a thief cannot transfer good title to any-
one; nor can a person receiving stolen goods from a thief, or a person in line of possession of a 
thief, obtain title to stolen goods. See, e.g., Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 922-23 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1985) (holding that "a possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired, 
can never convey good title") (quoting Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C. 
1971)); see also Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 16, 
19 (Ct. App. 1990). 
8. The caselaw relating to stolen artwork provides the best analogy for cases of stolen violins 
because of the similar nature of the article at issue. See Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen 
Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture, 43 DUKE L.J. 337 (1993) (discussing both the 
"demand rule" and the "discovery rule" as applied to stolen artwork); see also RALPH E. LER-
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tions until an aggrieved owner discovers the stolen item's wherea-
bouts9 and makes a timely demand for return of the item and the 
wrongful possessor refuses to return it. 10 The demand rule shifts the 
primary burden of investigation to the good-faith purchaser and re-
quires that she attempt to verify the provenance of artwork or a violin 
prior to purchase. In contrast, the majority rule, known as the "dis-
covery rule," tolls accrual of the owner's cause of action until the 
owner knows, or reasonably should know, the identity of the posses-
sor.11 Unlike the demand rule, the discovery rule shifts the primary 
burden to the owner by requiring that the owner notify relevant au-
thorities and conduct a diligent search for the stolen item. 
Harvey provides the retailer, auctioneer, collector, or teacher with 
practical guidelines for avoiding liability. For example, he suggests: 
• Remove offending labels when appropriate; 
• Use a prominent disclaimer in sales transactions in which a buyer may 
be misled as to attribution or description of the violin; 
• Use due diligence when preparing certifications of authenticity, ap-
praisals, or other documents that describe the instrument and identify in 
detail the instrument at issue; 
• When advertising the sale of an instrument make it clear that you are 
in the trade and not selling as a private person; 
• Do not attempt to exclude implied warranties of fitness and 
merchantability when defects are latent; 
• Keep copies of all documents provided to customers that contain de-
scriptions or attributions and keep records that will enable the violin 
dealer or maker to reidentify the instrument in the future; and 
NER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, 
AND ARTISTS 82-90 (Practising Law Institute No. Gl-1010, 1989). 
9. In most cases, it will be difficult for a true owner to acquire actual or constructive notice of 
the identity of the possessor of a stolen violin or piece of art because the item is usually kept in a 
private collection or home. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 871 (N.J. 1980) (finding 
the private residential display of stolen art insufficient to afford notice to the true owner). But see 
United States v. One Stradivarius Violin, 188 F. 542, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (finding the statute 
of limitations not tolled on a customs claim under a fraudulent concealment theory because the 
well-known Stradivarius violin was "habitually played on by different artists at [defendant's] 
Sunday afternoon musical parties" and on one occasion was played at a public concert), ajf d., 
197 F. 157 (2d Cir. 1912). 
10. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991); 
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (developing modified demand rule to in-
clude requirement of due diligence on the part of the owner in searching for a stolen painting), 
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), ajfd., 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 
1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), modification revd., 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 
1969). 
11. See, e.g., O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 874; Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus 
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), ajfd., 917 F.2d 278 
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 377 (1991); see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 338(c) (West 
Supp. 1994) (providing that a "cause of action in the case of theft ..• of any article of ••• artistic 
significance is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the article by 
the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law enforcement agency which originally investi-
gated the theft"). 
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• If you are a teacher or a dealer, do not accept or pay secret commis-
sions arising from sales to students. 12 
Harvey's practical guidelines should be helpful to those involved in the 
violin trade. 
II. THE HAzARDS OF SECRET COMMISSIONS AND THE DUTY To 
DISCLOSE 
It is common practice in the United States, and apparently in Eng-
land, for teachers to receive secret commissions "from particular deal-
ers in whose direction the pupil has been deliberately pointed" (p. 
118). Harvey suggests that this practice is an abuse of the teacher's 
position of trust, may be a breach of the teacher's contract of employ-
ment, and may even be a crime in England (pp. 47, 118). In his practi-
cal guidelines section, he further states: 
Secret profits like these are held by the fiduciary (i.e. the teacher) in trust 
for the beneficiary (the pupil) and if the practice is discovered the teacher 
will be required to account for the money. Traders, too, should elimi-
nate the payment of this type of commission in the terms of any Code of 
Practice. [p. 118] 
The harm of secret commissions is felt not just by the student, who 
may be paying for his teacher's commission through an inflated sales 
price. In addition, violin makers and dealers who refuse to engage in 
this industry custom may suffer competitive injury when teachers 
choose to send their students elsewhere. 
Generally, students place special confidence and trust in their vio-
lin teachers, and teachers have great power to influence decisions 
made by their students, who typically rely on their teachers' expertise, 
superior knowledge, and training. In certain circumstances, there may 
be a special relationship of trust and confidence between teacher and 
student that may arguably give rise to an elevated duty of care by the 
teacher or even a fiduciary duty. 13 The special relationship that exists 
between a student and her violin teacher may expose the teacher to 
liability for accepting secret commissions when a conflict of interest 
exists between the teacher's self-interest in obtaining commissions and 
her duty to the student. 
Although no reported case in the United States has addressed the 
legality of secret commissions in this context, the practice of paying 
and receiving secret commissions may run afoul of state statutes. For 
example, California's Unfair Practices Act arguably prohibits secret 
commissions under the appropriate factual scenario: 
12. Harvey includes these and other suggestions in an appendix. Pp. 114-18. 
13. See 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary 385 (1961) ("A fiduciary relationship may exist or come into 
being whenever trust and confidence are reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of 
another .•• or when there is a reposing of faith, confidence, and trust, and the placing of reliance 
by one person on the judgment and advice of another."). Whether or not a fiduciary relationship 
exists is a question of fact. Id. at 387. 
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The secret payment or allowance of rebates, refunds, commissions, or 
unearned discounts, whether in the form of money or otherwise, or 
secretly extending to certain purchasers special services or privileges not 
extended to all purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions, to 
the injury of a competitor and where such payment or allowance tends to 
destroy competition, is unlawful 14 
In addition, concealing a commission may constitute actionable 
fraudulent concealment under the common law if the teacher's special 
or fiduciary relationship with the student gives rise to a duty to dis-
close.15 In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, a teacher may com-
mit actionable fraudulent concealment when she makes some 
representations relating to the sales transaction but suppresses the ar-
guably material fact that she is receiving a commission from the 
seller.16 
The payment of secret commissions by a violin dealer or maker to 
a teacher also may be an antitrust violation under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, which provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, any-
thing of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or 
any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in 
connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, 
either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representa-
tive, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in 
fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any 
party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compen-
sation is so granted or paid.17 
In Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 18 a photogra-
pher paid commissions to schools in exchange for the schools' en-
dorsement as the "official photographer." Both the photographer and 
the schools disclosed to the students that an unspecified portion of the 
14. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 17045 (West 1987) (emphasis added); see also United States 
v. Di Girolamo, 808 F. Supp. 1445, 1450-52 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that kickbacks paid to 
obtain a competitive edge violated California's Unfair Practices Act). 
15. See, e.g., Heliotis v. Schuman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[N]ondisclosure 
or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not 
known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; 
and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material 
facts." (citing 4 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 459-464 (8th ed. 
1974))). 
16. See, e.g., Zinn v. Ex-Cello-0 Corp., 306 P.2d 1017, 1025 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) 
("(W]here the defendant, who has no duty to speak, nevertheless does so •.. he is bound to speak 
truthfully and to speak the whole truth."); see also Rogers v. Warden, 125 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1942); 
R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 551 cmt. g (1977). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988). See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 
(9th Cir. 1965) (holding that a corporate defendant's commercial bribes to a state employee to 
obtain competitive advantage violated § 13(c)), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). 
18. 713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd., 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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photograph price would be given to each school to support various 
school activities. 
When a competitor challenged this practice, the district court 
found that section 13(c) had not been violated. "Because secrecy is an 
essential element of Section 13(c) commercial bribery, the contractual 
arrangement at issue here is not illegal."19 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling without addressing the secrecy issue. 
Instead, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the schools did not act as 
agents, representatives, or intermediaries on behalf of the students, as 
those terms are used in section 13(c).20 
Similarly, in Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers, 21 the court found no 
antitrust violation when the operator of a duty-free store made secret 
payments to tour companies and tour guides to promote its shop. The 
court concluded that the tour operators and guides were not in an 
agency or fiduciary relationship with their passengers and did not 
serve as intermediaries subject to the passengers' direct or indirect 
control as to the purchase of the store's goods. 22 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts in Harris from the 
agency relationship in McCollum v. Friendly Hills Travel Center. 23 In 
McCollum, the court held that a fiduciary relationship existed between 
a tourist and his travel agent because the travel agent "had arranged 
his trip and had vouched for the excellent condition of certain sporting 
equipment," the defects of which later caused the plaintllrs injuries. 24 
In contrast to the facts in Harris and Stephen Jay Photography, a 
violin teacher, much like the agent in McCollum, may act as a special 
agent for the student or as an intermediary for purposes of the 
purchase transaction. The teacher may arrange for the specific trans-
action and vouch for the condition and attributes of the violin, thereby 
arguably creating a relationship between the student and the teacher 
worthy of protection by the antitrust laws. 
Although section 13(c) does make an exception for services ren-
dered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, the exception 
will not apply when the teacher receives a commissi0n for services 
rendered to the seller but against the best interest of the buyer.25 
19. 713 F. Supp. at 941. 
20. Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1990). 
21. 940 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1991). 
22. 940 F.2d at 1275. 
23. 217 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1985). 
24. Harris, 940 F.2d at 1274-75 (citing McCol/um, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 923). 
25. See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1965) 
(refusing to construe the "services rendered" exeeption to include services performed by a 
buyer's agent for the seller but against the interest of the buyer, because such an interpretation 
would undermine the fiduciary relationship between buyers and their agents), cert. denied, 383 
U.S. 936 (1966); Modem Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commn., 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 
1945) (finding that brokerage commissions could not be paid by sellers to the buyers' agent for 
services that were incidental to the agent's main activities on behalf of the buyers, even though 
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One way to avoid potential liability for violation of state unfair 
trade practices statutes, for fraud, or for violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act in connection with commissions is for teachers to be com-
pensated openly for the valuable expert service that they can provide 
to their students in the instrument-selection process by candidly ac-
cepting payment for such expert services. In the absence of such a 
disclosure, violin teachers, dealers, and makers expose themselves to 
possible liability if the requisite degree of trust and confidence is re-
posed in the teacher by the student with respect to circumstances sur-
rounding the student's purchase of a violin. 
III. DISCOVERY OF FRAUD AND DECEPTION: FIDDLING AWAY 
THE TIME AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Harvey states in his summary of practical guidelines that to avoid 
or minimize potential liability "[c]ertificates etc. of authenticity should 
normally do no more then express an opinion" (p. 115). Under Ameri-
can law, however, the courts will likely treat a representation cloaked 
in "opinion" language to avoid liability for fraud, negligence, or 
breach of warranty as an actionable misrepresentation of fact when 
made by a violin dealer or maker who holds himself out to the public 
as an expert and when the buyer reasonably relies on such superior 
knowledge to her detriment. 26 
Although Harvey does not discuss the details of litigating civil 
claims for false certification or misdescription on a breach of contract 
or warranty theory, one major issue may be whether or not the statute 
of limitations bars such a claim. For example, if a violin dealer or 
maker knowingly or negligently misrepresents the authenticity of a vi-
olin in connection with a sale by incorrectly stating that the violin was 
made by Stradivarius, a buyer's claim may not reasonably be discov-
ered until the owner decides to sell the violin, which may be twenty 
years or more after the purchase. 27 
The applicable statute of limitations and the buyer's duty to dis-
the services were genuine and of benefit to the sellers). In Modern Marketing, the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that "[t]he agent cannot serve two masters simultaneously rendering services in an 
arm's length transaction to both." 149 F.2d at 978 (quoting Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Commn., 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939)). 
Even when a seller renders a service for the benefit of the student-buyer, when the actual 
services rendered are de minimis, the exception to § 13(c) will probably provide no refuge. Cf. 
Hennegan v. Pacifico Creative Serv., Inc., 674 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Guam 1987) (holding that 
§ 13(c) does not prohibit payments by store owners to tour bus drivers for services rendered in 
bringing tourists to their stores because such services are not de minimis). 
26. See, e.g., Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) 
("Where the party making the representations has superior knowledge regarding the subject mat-
ter of his representations, and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely on such 
supposed superior knowledge or special information, the representations may be considered as 
fact and not opinion." (citations omitted)); see also Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 
F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (D. Haw. 1990). 
27. See, e.g., Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a breach of 
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cover the seller's misrepresentation have been the subject of litigation 
in the art world with interesting and disparate results. In cases involv-
ing works of art, the First, 28 Second, 29 and Third Circuits30 have fore-
closed buyers from obtaining a remedy for breach of warranty claims 
when they failed to discover the breach until after the running of the 
applicable statute of limitations, which is generally four years from 
tender of delivery under the Uniform Commercial Code.31 These cir-
cuits have held that the statute of limitations bars claims for breach of 
warranty when the warranty does not explicitly extend to future per-
formance and when discovery of an alleged defect in a work of art 
does not necessarily await future performance. 32 This result may ap-
pear harsh when a buyer bas no obvious reason to obtain a second 
opinion regarding attribution or description of a violin until be decides 
to sell the violin - in many instances more than four years after 
purchase and after the statute of limitations bas arguably barred his 
breach of contract and warranty claims. 
In sharp contrast to the First, Second, and Third Circuits, the trial 
court in Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc. 33 found that the 
buyer was effectively precluded by the price of the artwork - pur-
ported works by Salvador Dali that were purchased for a total of 
$36,200 - as well as by the defendant's repeated assurances and 
fraudulent concealment of the truth, from unde~king an extensive 
investigation into the veracity of the seller's claims of authenticity un-
til ten years after the purchase, when the buyer became aware of news-
paper articles and television reports that indicated that the defendant's 
representations might be false. 34 
The Balog court held: 
[I]n the case of art work which is certified authentic by an expert in the 
warranty claim for the sale of a fake painting brought 20 years after purchase was barred by the 
statute of limitations). 
28. Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 F.2d 3, 4-7 (1st Cir. 1988). 
29. Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31. 
30. Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League, 833 F.2d. 304 (3d. Cir.}, affg. without opinion 
672 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
31. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1990). However, § 2-725(2) provides an exception to the four-year 
statute of limitations. If "a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and 
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues 
when the breach is or should have been discovered." U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1990) (emphasis added}. 
A sales agreement may also shorten the four-year statute of limitations to "not less than one 
year." U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1990). 
32. See Wilson, 850 F.2d at 4-7; Rosen 894 F.2d at 31-32; Firestone, 672 F. Supp. at 822; see 
also Lawson v. London Arts Group, 708 F.2d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting in dicta that, 
although the plaintiff did not reasonably suspect a breach of warranty claim until well after the 
four-year statute of limitations set forth in U.C.C. § 2-725(2), "it would not have been impossible 
for her to have discovered the breach earlier. Consequently, this discovery did not necessarily 
have to await the [artwork's] future 'performance.' "). 
33. 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990). 
34. 745 F. Supp. at 1558-59, 1566. 
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field or a merchant dealing in goods of that type, such a certification of 
authenticity constitutes an explicit warranty of future performance suffi-
cient to toll the U. C. C. 's statute of limitations. 35 
Applying the discovery rule, the Balog court further held that "the 
limitations period of a claim of a party seeking damages for breach of 
such warranty accrues at the time when the breach is discovered or 
reasonably should have been discovered."36 
The type of claim pled by a purchaser of a violin or artwork may 
be critical because the measure of damages recoverable for a fraud or 
negligence claim - restoration to pretransaction status - may, de-
pending on the jurisdiction, 37 preclude the buyer from obtaining lost 
profits or appreciation damages,38 whereas a breach of contract or 
warranty claim may provide the.buyer with compensation for the ben-
efit of the agreement had it been fully performed. 39 
The discovery rule will only apply to claims for breach of warranty 
under U.C.C. § 2-725(2) if a warranty explicitly extends to the future 
performance of the goods and if discovery of the breach must await 
the time of such performance.40 As previously discussed, there is a 
split in authority as to how section 2-725(2) should be applied to 
claims involving artwork. The better view on the warranty-of-future 
performance prong of section 2-725(2) is set forth in Balog because the 
authenticity of a violin or artwork is not expected to change over time. 
Therefore, if a seller warrants that a violin is an authentic Stradivarius, 
35. 745 F. Supp. at 1570 (emphasis added). The court went on to note that artwork, as well 
as antiques, are "the type of thing about which questions as to authenticity normally arise only at 
some future time, usually the time of resale." 745 F. Supp. at 1570 n.22, 1571. "Since artwork 
does not 'perform' in the traditional sense of goods covered by the U.C.C., and since the authen· 
ticity of a work of art, i.e. its 'performance', would not change over time, [defendant's] warranty 
necessarily guaranteed the present and future existence of the art as authentic works of Salvador 
Dali." 745 F. Supp. at 1571. 
36. Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572. 
37. If a buyer sues under a tort theory, he may not be able to recover lost profits or apprecia-
tion damages. The result will depend on whether the jurisdiction follows the "benefit-of-the-
bargain" rule, the "out-of-pocket-loss" rule, or some modification thereof. If the out-of-pocket-
loss rule is followed, the defrauded plaintiff generally recovers only the consideration paid. If the 
benefit-of-the-bargain rule is followed, the plaintiff may be able to recover lost profits or apprecia-
tion damages. California has established a highly modified out-of-pocket-loss rule under Civil 
Code § 3343 that authorizes recovery oflost profits as consequential damages. CAL. C1v. CODE 
§ 3343 (West Supp. 1993). See, e.g., Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248-49 (Ct. 
App. 1977); see also Koerner v. Davis & Stein Galleries, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 0742 (S.D.N.Y. May 
21, 1987) (awarding the plaintiff a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages, which included 
appreciation damages, for claims of conversion for failure to return a stolen painting after 
demand). 
38. Lost profits or appreciation damages may be an important component of a claim when a 
buyer purchases a violin made by a purported famous maker, which, if genuine, would have 
appreciated in value after purchase. 
39. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969) (permitting a buyer to obtain 
appreciation damages for a breach of warranty of title claim under the Uniform Sales Act in 
connection with the sale of artwork). 
40. u.c.c. § 2-725(2) (1990). 
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this warranty should be deemed a warranty that extends to future per-
formance of the goods under U.C.C. § 2-725(2). However, a pur-
chaser of a violin remains at risk of failing to meet the second prong of 
U.C.C. § 2-725(2) if the purchaser does not obtain a second opinion as 
to the authenticity of the violin within four years of tender of delivery. 
CONCLUSION 
Violin Fraud is an interesting and enjoyable examination of the 
culpability that may arise out of the false attribution and description 
of violins, with a message targeted not only at consumers but also at 
violin dealers, makers, auctioneers, and other sellers of the violin. 
Harvey provides a valuable contribution in an area in which there is a 
dearth of legal discussion, although some of the issues raised closely 
mirror issues addressed in the field of art law. Violin Fraud provides 
an excellent foundation for further legal inquiry into, and analysis of, 
the gray areas implicated by the specialized area of violin commerce. 
